
By Dr. Sidney Holt
Page 18 of this year's Report of the Scientific Committee carries
the most
acrimonious attack, on one of its most brilliant and distinguished
members,
that I have seen in 35 years of attendance at the IWC. And the
written
account is mild compared with what I have been told was actually
said by a
few of the attackers; it is an open secret that they were led
by members
from the Norwegian, US and UK delegations. Their target was Dr.
Justin
Cooke, the designer of the victorious formula for the so-called
Catch Limit
Algorithm of the Revised Management Procedure (RMP).
Dr. Cooke's "crime" was to try to reproduce the Norwegian
estimates of the
number of minke whales in the Northeast Atlantic from surveys
conducted in
1989 and 1995. He is the only non-Norwegian scientist who has
actually been
doing the work the Committee has said is necessary. His double
crime was to
change his mind about his participation in a consensus statement
which
emerged from the Oslo meeting of the Committee's Abundance Estimation
Working Group last April, in the light of further analyses he
had since
made. For that the malicious story has been put around that he
has forsaken
his scientific "principles" on the altar of his well-known
"green" beliefs;
i.e. that he is now cheating.
Readers may remember that last year the Scientific Committee said
it was in
future "...determined to avoid its mistake of prematurely
accepting an
abundance estimate" and that it is "...developing procedures
to minimize
the likelihood that similar mistakes happen in the future."
Dr. Cooke was
the man who revealed the previous mistake and his caution was
supported at
the time by a few worried Committee members -- which subsequent
events have
proven to be right.
The majority of the Committee this year has insisted on repeating
the same
mistake and, furthermore, has not followed its own agreed procedure.
That
procedure involved very intensive computer simulations of analytical
methods. Cooke completed and presented to the Committee the full
suite of
required simulations (more than 400) for his own method; Dr. Schweder,
the
Norwegian scientist mainly involved, only presented the results
of four
simulations for his method, mainly because his software is so
inefficient
that it takes an inordinate time to run. Yet instead of waiting
to complete
the outstanding simulations, and itself calculating the resulting
numbers
by both methods, the Committee agreed simply to "accept"
the Norwegian
estimates.
Let us be clear about this. The controversy
is not at this time so much
about the numbers of whales. Rather, it is about a validated method
of
analysis. Dr. Cooke, working alone, did not in the end have time
to
calculate the number implied by his method because he concentrated
on
rigorously following the simulation requirements of the Committee.
Dr.
Schweder, by contrast, did not perform the crucial simulation
tests, but he
did calculate a number by his still unvalidated method.
Why? Let me offer a suggestion. In order to justify, retrospectively,
the
level of their resumed commercial whaling under objections to
IWC
decisions, the Norwegian authorities must have a figure for the
number of
minke whales. Because they have based the defense of their practices
on
adherence to the IWC's RMP, they must have the "right"
number, i.e. not the
"correct" number but rather the right one for that justification.
This is
approximately at least 80,000 whales.
They thought they had it when, in 1992, the Scientific Committee
was
mistakenly persuaded to accept Schweder's estimate of 86,736 from
the 1989
survey. Later the raw data were declassified and in 1994 Cooke
reported he
had been unable to verify this figure and instead came up with
results
implying a much lower number--about 53,000. He had been unable
to find out
the cause of the discrepancy.
In 1995 the Norwegians revealed they
had found programming errors in their
software. But instead of simply correcting these and recalculating
-- which
would have given a means of comparing the two methods objectively
-- they
said they had also modified the method itself; this enabled Schweder
to
present a "revised" figure of 75,000--so still in the
right ball-park for
retrospective justification of the Norwegian 1994 catch limit.
The Committee, to its credit, did not adopt that new number, but
that did
not stop the Norwegian authorities from announcing to their press
and to
the rest of the world that it was the correct one.
In the following months the Norwegian estimate was revised down
again, to
about 67,000, and Cooke's to about 43,000. The Scientific Committee
did not
investigate this discrepancy, despite Cooke's pleas to do so.
But meanwhile
the new survey had been carried out, from which the Norwegians
obtained the
unverified 1995 number of 118,000.
The RMP depends on a sort of average if there has been more than
one recent
survey. The average of 67,000 and 118,000 is 91,000. Strangely,
this is
rather more than the Norwegians needed to justify their 1995 catches,
but
sufficient to justify the much higher limit they have set themselves
for
1996.
What is worrying is that these sorts of games tend to discredit
not only
the Scientific Committee, but also the Commission itself. How
can the
public, or even the scientific community in general, hold to their
recently
and laboriously restored confidence in the Commission as a responsible
international institution in the face of such behavior, especially
of the
contemptible persecution of the mildest and best mannered of
"whistle-blowers"?
I became involved in the affairs of the
IWC in 1960, at a time when
Commissioners, led then by the US, vigorously expressed their
dissatisfaction with the way that the Scientific Committee had
been
acquiescing in a numbers game that gave the whaling countries
virtually all
that they wanted. Recently, Dr. Schweder has, under the cloak
of
"historical research," publicly attacked, as individuals,
those members of
the Committee whose views at that time happened to coincide with
the
policies of their governments. While I abhor Schweder's behavior,
it might
be useful for both the public and other, independent, scientists
to examine
the relationship between the "official" scientific representatives
of the
Norwegian and the US Governments, and of the policies of their
countries:
one to make as much money as possible from increasing minke whaling;
the
other to avoid at all costs any confrontation with Norway which
might force
its Administration to follow Department of Commerce advice and
apply
economic sanctions.
If the IWC's scientists continue to rubber-stamp the whalers'
own estimates
of numbers, then one long step will have been taken towards the
marginalization of the IWC. This is what happened in the early
years of the
IWC, with well-known disastrous results. It is happening again.
We seem to be entering a phase in whaling history in which governments
of
the IWC acquiesce in de facto self-regulation by the whaling industries,
with non-whaling countries merely saying--through mild resolutions--"tut
tut!" to escalating commercial whaling under objections and
scientific
permits.
To help re-polish the Commission's tarnished image, the scientists
should
at least be required to be rigorous in devising systematic and
credible
checks on analytical methods and their application, and adhering
strictly
to them. A reconsideration of the validity of the basic survey
data is also
now called for. For example, the numbers spewed out from the computers
depend critically on the ability of the observers carrying out
the surveys
accurately and consistently to judge the distance of a spotted
whale from
the vessel in all environmental conditions, unaided by instruments.
Anyone
with seagoing experience knows this is extraordinarily difficult
to do.
In accepting the RMP the Commission was
led by scientists to believe that
the minimal information required for its eventual
implementation--reasonable estimates of current numbers and of
their
statistical uncertainty--could be available when needed. This
is evidently
not yet the case, though it should not forever be out of reach.
The Commission decided not to implement the RMP until all other
elements of
a Revised Management System (RMS) had also been agreed and were
embedded in
the Schedule. The Commission does not itself need a number at
this time; it
does need a tested and agreed method for obtaining a number when
it is
required.
Why is the Scientific Committee in such a frantic hurry to "accept"
an
unvalidated number in this case?
The Japanese have started to crack the
whip to ensure that their Caribbean
minions understand the purpose for which they have been recruited.
Japan's Ringmaster was overheard saying to the Caribbean Puppetmaster
on
Monday, "These Caribbean countries have got to be kept in
line, otherwise
we will cut off their funding." Puppetmaster was then heard
to stammer
assurances that they would work for their keep.
Meanwhile a neophyte Caribbean commissioner--no stranger to being
purchased
since in his own country he was elected to Parliament on the ticket
of one
party but was bought over to serve the ruling party--seemed anxious
to
demonstrate he had learned his lines well. On Sunday morning he
made a
statement that his government is committed to the total utilization
of its
resources in the sea. Translation: Our Japanese ringmaster has
shouted
orders and "For a few yen more" we are compelled to
say that anything
living in the sea is fair game to be hunted to extinction.
The leading newspaper in the State of
Washington this week called for the
IWC to reject the U.S. bid for an aboriginal kill of gray whales.
The Seattle Times, which covers a huge area of northern Washington,
including the Olympic Peninsula where the Makah Tribe lives, declared:
"No
more harpoons. Whales are for watching."
The states of Washington, Oregon and California, where millions
of citizens
watch the migrating gray whales each year, are mobilizing to oppose
the
kill that is being pushed by a handful of Makah and the Clinton/Gore
Administration in Washington.
"The Makah nation's request to resume its long-abandoned
whale hunt set up
an awkward clash of values that threatens to weaken the U.S. case
against
whaling around the world," states the Seattle Times in its
23 June
editorial. "The result is a public policy picture about as
pretty as a
butchered whale carcass on Seattle's Alki Beach."
"Whether the motivation is cultural or commercial is irrelevant.
The Makahs
make a strong case, bolstered by Inuit whaling rights in the Bering
Sea.
But their claim is no more legitimate than that of the Japanese
or the
Norwegians, equally ancient whaling cultures that propose to hunt
healthy
populations of minke whales. Those whale hunts have been firmly
opposed by
the U.S.," the editorial continues.
"By supporting the Makah bid to the IWC, the U.S. sets up
an untenable
double standard: Native American whaling is legitimate but Japanese
whaling
is not. It will get worse; tribes from Washington to the Bering
Sea are
sharpening their harpoons, waiting for the Makahs to get the go-ahead,"
says the Seattle newspaper.
"As creatures that routinely migrate the globe, whales demand
a coherent
and consistent international policy. If the world community approves
the
Makah's whale hunt, then Japan deserves the same."
"But the long, grim history of commercial whaling points
to a tougher
response: No more harpoons. Whales are for watching."
The whaling nations are hungrily anticipating the huge loophole
in IWC
rules that a Makah quota would create. In a statement submitted
to this IWC
meeting, the Global Guardian Trust, a front group for the Japanese
whaling
industry, declared: "GGT applauds the initiative taken by
the United States
to reintroduce a small-scale whaling for Makah Indians and strongly
hopes
that the United States further extends its support to other whaling
activities such as Norwegian and Japanese coastal whaling."
For the second year running, the Danish
Delegation and its acolytes were
frustrated by bottlenose whales and the Infractions Committee.
The Faroese publication Grindabod revealed the continued intention
of
NAMMCO, (the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission) to get their
knives
and forks on these whales.
But when the Faroese slaughter of bottlenose whales was discussed,
Mr. Finn
Lynge, Alternate Danish Commissioner, denied that Denmark will
accept
management of bottlenose whales by NAMMCO. Denmark agrees that
this species
is protected by the Moratorium, with all its implications.
Mr. Lynge, however, defended the Faroese practice of "assisted
strandings,"
only to find himself floundering like a beached bottlenose. Unbeknownst
to
him, the Faroese scientist, Dorete Bloch, had recently published
a
paper--scientific and peer reviewed, of course--in the Journal
of the
Zoological Society of London. She explains that in the Faroes,
bottlenose
whales are either killed once they have accidentally stranded
or are
deliberately driven ashore and then slaughtered.
Her historical catch records demonstrate that 17 whales have been
deliberately driven ashore and killed since this species was made
a
protected stock by the Commission in 1977--indisputable infractions
of IWC
regulations, breaches of the Moratorium and breaches of Faroese
Law which
also forbids hunting of this species.
But the Faroese have even more explaining to do. On 20th August
1995, two
bottlenose whales were killed. On September 14th, three more were
killed.
Reports from the Faroes state that all five whales were deliberately
driven
ashore.
(Sung to the tune of "Loch Lomond")
Oh, Japan will take the high road,
And Norway will take the low road,
And Norway will be a whalin' afore ye,
For me and my harpoon will never never part,
I wonder if there're Minke in Loch Lomond?
Return to ECO Index
Page
